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THE EVOLUTION OF REDLINING POST-
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
MARTHA J. SVOBODA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, financial regulators and enforcement 
agencies such as the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) and the United States Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) have made fair lending enforcement a major priority.  Possibly 
in response to the recent financial crisis and its arguably disproportionate 
impact on the ability of individuals in legally protected classes to achieve 
the “American dream” of home ownership, these agencies became more 
creative in the application of the legal standards of discrimination to 
perceived inequality in lending practices.  The current version of 
discriminatory “redlining” that is the subject of this Article reflects this 
novel approach—an approach that has strayed somewhat far afield from 
the traditional version of the legal standard. 
Part I of this Article provides an introductory foundation, and 
includes an explanation of the legal concepts embodied by the term “fair 
lending,” a review of the statutory sources of fair lending law, a 
description of the three legal standards for evidencing discrimination in 
the fair lending context, and an overview of the mechanism by which a 
fair lending enforcement case may be commenced.1  Part II delves further 
into the concept of redlining.2  It describes what is meant by use of the 
term, illustrates the accelerating pace of redlining cases over the past 
decade, and reviews a few selected recent enforcement cases for the 
 
* Martha J. Svoboda is Of Counsel in the Financial Services Practice Group of Poyner Spruill 
LLP, and a proud alumna of the University of North Carolina School of Law and the North 
Carolina Banking Institute Journal. Ms. Svoboda advises banks and other financial 
institutions across the country on all aspects of financial regulatory compliance, including the 
“alphabet soup” of consumer protection statutes and regulations; fair lending and fair 
servicing; the Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering; compliance management 
systems; vendor management; and financial privacy concerns. 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
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important insights they offer.3 Part III theorizes about the changes in the 
application of the fair lending disparate treatment standard, considers the 
possible impact on supervision and enforcement as a result of the shifting 
political winds, and offers guidance for institutions as to how best to 
comply with legal and regulatory expectations.4 Finally, Part IV 
summarizes the topics and offers concluding thoughts.5 
A. What is Fair Lending? 
The term “fair lending” refers to the fair, impartial, and 
unprejudiced access to credit for qualified persons.6  Stated another way, 
individuals who are otherwise qualified to receive credit cannot be denied 
access to such credit during any aspect of the credit pre-application, 
application, and approval process based on some personal characteristic 
that is protected under the law. 
Importantly, fair lending law does not require an institution to 
make bad loans.7  There is a common misperception that a depository 
institution will subject itself to heightened credit risk and the 
accompanying safety and soundness concerns simply by having an 
effective fair lending program.  To the contrary, regulatory requirements 
obligate an institution to take steps to satisfy itself that the borrower has 
the ability to repay the loan obligation prior to making the loan.8  
 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(13) (2016). 
 7. See, e.g., Consent Order at 20, United States v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 1:16cv118 
(N.D. Miss. 2016) (reiterating that “[n]o provision of this Order requires Defendant to make 
any unsafe or unsound loan or to make a loan to a person who is not qualified for the loan 
based upon lawful, nondiscriminatory terms . . .”) (discussed infra Part II.A.2); see also FED. 
RESERVE BD., CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (2016), available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair_lend_fhact.pdf (“[B]anks are not 
expected to make unsound real estate loans or to render services on more-favorable terms to 
applicants solely because of the applicant’s status as a member of a protected class.  However, 
denying loans or services on this basis is illegal.”). 
 8. As early as December of 2005, federal banking regulators began to express concern 
about the upward trend in the prevalence of nontraditional mortgages that allowed borrowers 
to defer repayment of mortgage principal and, in many cases, interest.  One underlying issue 
involved the potential inability of a borrower to repay the mortgage obligation once the 
deferment period ended. In response, the Federal Reserve Board and other federal banking 
regulatory agencies finalized interagency supervisory guidance in June of 2007.  This 
informal guidance set forth certain underwriting standards the supervised institutions were to 
follow prior to issuance of certain types of nontraditional mortgage loans to help ensure that 
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In the broadest sense, every successful lender “discriminates,” in 
that such a lender will avoid those potential borrowers who are unlikely 
to repay the obligation and instead favor (i.e., provide loans to) those 
most likely to repay.  The fair lending issue only arises when the 
discriminatory treatment of the individual occurs because of any of a 
number of individual characteristics that are protected by law.9  In most 
fair lending cases, allegations of violations are charged under both the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act.10  The protected 
 
a borrower had the ability to repay the credit obligation.  State banking and mortgage 
regulators soon followed suit by issuing “parallel statements” that were adopted by many 
states.  See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522, 44528 (July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 226) (discussing in the Preamble to the Final Rule the informal guidance that existed prior 
to the 2008 formal notice-and-comment rulemaking).  Rather than continue to rely on 
informal guidance, the Federal Reserve Board (having rule-making authority for the Truth-
In-Lending Act and other consumer financial regulations prior to the emergence of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) finalized rules to prohibit creditors from extending 
credit for “higher-priced mortgage loans” and loans subject to the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act unless the borrower demonstrated an “ability to repay from sources 
other than the collateral itself.”  Id. at 44539 (codified at 12 CFR 226.34(a)(4)(ii) and 
226.35(b)(1)). These protections were amplified and extended to all “consumer credit 
transaction[s] . . . secured by a dwelling” in the “Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage 
Standards” Rule promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that became 
effective January 10, 2014.  See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under 
the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6585 (Jan. 30, 2013) (codified 
at 12 CFR 1026.32 and 1026.43) (requiring that “[a] creditor shall not make a loan that is a 
covered transaction unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination at or 
before consummation that the consumer will have a reasonable ability to repay the loan 
according to its terms”) [hereinafter PROCEDURES]. 
 9. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION 
PROCEDURES iii (Aug. 2009) (explaining that “[d]isparate treatment occurs when a lender 
treats a credit applicant differently based on one of the prohibited bases”) .  See also FED. 
RESERVE BD., supra note 7 (observing that “[redlining] is unlawful under the FHAct only 
when done on a prohibited basis”). 
 10. Observe that the ECOA has a broad application to “any aspect of a credit transaction” 
(15 U.S.C. § 1691), whereas the FHAct is less specific in its application but has a wide scope 
of prohibition of discrimination against any person in making available a residential real 
estate-related transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction (42 U.S.C. § 
3604).  See more detailed discussion of the ECOA and the FHAct infra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2. 
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characteristics11 vary based on the statute, 12 but most cases involve race 
or national origin.13  
B. Two Statutory Sources Of Fair Lending Law 
Fair lending law derives from two primary statutes: the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”)14 and the Fair Housing Act 
(“FHAct”).15 
1. ECOA 
The ECOA was enacted in 1974 as an amendment to the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.  As its name suggests, the 
purpose of the statute is to provide an equal opportunity for credit to 
certain protected classes.  This purpose is to be achieved by forbidding 
discrimination on a prohibited basis against a credit applicant during any 
aspect of a credit transaction.16  The ECOA was amended in 1976 to add 
 
 11. Throughout, the terms “protected characteristic(s),” “protected class(es),” and 
“prohibited basis (bases)” may be used interchangeably and have the same meaning. 
 12. ECOA and the FHAct each protect against discrimination on the basis of the 
following characteristics: race/color, religion, national origin, and sex.  ECOA also prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of marital status, age, the receipt of public assistance income, and 
an applicant’s good faith exercise of any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.  15 
U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2016).  The FHAct provides further protection against discrimination on 
the basis of familial status or handicap.  42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (2016); 24 C.F.R. § 100.110(b) 
(2017).  Additionally, a HUD Rule now prohibits discrimination in a housing transaction on 
the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. 24 C.F.R. § 5.105(a)(2).  
As a general warning, because a complaint involving a violation of one statute will often also 
allege a violation of the other, the best practice is to not discriminate on the basis of any of 
these characteristics. 
 13. See, e.g., FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at v (observing that 
the agency fair lending examination “procedures emphasize racial and national origin 
discrimination in residential transactions, but the key principles are applicable to other 
prohibited bases . . . .”). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2016). 
 16. Although outside the scope of this Article, it is important to an overall understanding 
of ECOA to realize that the scope of the regulation extends throughout the life of the loan.  
This means that ECOA is also applicable to the way in which the loan is serviced and 
modifications are made.  See, e.g., CFPB, MORTGAGE SERVICING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES 
29 (June 2016) (cautioning that during the review of the servicer’s loss mitigation activities, 
“examiners must be mindful of activities that may indicate disparate treatment in violation of 
the ECOA . . . .”).  Observe that the implication of fair lending with respect to mortgage 
servicing was highlighted as one of three “key areas where the CFPB’s fair lending team [was 
to have] focus[ed] in 2017.”  Patrice Ficklin, Fair Lending Priorities in the New Year, 
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more prohibited bases beyond the original sex and marital status 
discriminatory prohibitions.17 
The statute itself is not very explicit, so the agency that was 
tasked with implementation of the statute18 adopted Regulation B to 
provide more specific guidance.  Regulation B clarifies, in part, that “[a] 
creditor shall not make any oral or written statement, in advertising or 
otherwise, to applicants or prospective applicants that would discourage 
on a prohibited basis a reasonable person from making or pursuing an 
application.”19  As will be discussed in further detail, the ECOA 
prohibition on discouragement, even as to potential applicants, may be 
one reason that regulators and the DOJ have begun to scrutinize the 
advertising campaigns (or the lack thereof) of the subject financial 
institution,20 and also may have led to a new analytical focus that 
compares the market penetration of the subject institution to that of its 
peers.21 
2. The FHAct 
The second statutory source of fair lending law, the FHAct, was 
passed as Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.22  The Act forbids 
discrimination on a prohibited basis23 in housing transactions.  In the 
 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 16, 2016), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/fair-lending-priorities-new-year/. 
 17. See, e.g., MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 276 (5th ed. 1999) 
(explaining that subsequent to the initial enactment in 1974, Congress amended the Act in 
1976 to include the additional prohibited characteristics). 
 18. Originally, the Federal Reserve Board was tasked with rulemaking authority related 
to the statute.  However, rule-making authority for this and other consumer financial 
protection statutes was transferred to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1085(3), 15 U.S.C. § 
1691b (2016); Dodd-Frank § 1042, 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2016). 
 19. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 1002.4(b) (2017) (entitled 
“Discouragement”).  See list of prohibited characteristics, supra note 12. 
 20. For further discussion, see infra Part II. 
 21. See infra note 175 (analyzing the advantage to a financial institution to select the 
appropriate peer group, as opposed to having the supervisory or enforcement agency make 
that determination). 
 22. See Fair Housing Act § 805, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2016) (regulating fair lending in 
residential real estate transactions).  See also FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 7 (asserting that, 
because of the broad way in which the civil rights statutes were written by Congress, “[a] 
variety of lending practices have been found to be illegal under the act, including some that 
are not specifically mentioned in the act but that have been determined to be illegal because 
they violate requirements and prohibitions that are implicit in the act’s language”). 
 23. For a list of prohibited-basis characteristics, see supra note 12. 
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disparate treatment context that is the subject of this Article, the FHAct 
applies to loans with a home-based purpose or loans where residential 
real estate is taken as collateral.24   
3. HMDA and CRA 
Two additional statutes having fair lending implications are often 
conflated with the fair lending laws that actually prohibit discrimination:  
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (“HMDA”)25 and the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA”).26  
The HMDA is not a fair lending statute per se, in that it does not 
expressly prohibit discriminatory lending behavior.  Rather, it is a data 
collection and reporting statute related to a financial institution’s27 
mortgage lending activity.  One of its three enumerated purposes is to 
“assist identification of possible discriminatory lending patterns and 
enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes.”28  The statute’s 
 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b) (2016); 24 C.F.R. 100.115 (2017).  With respect to the FHAct, 
HUD has the rulemaking and enforcement authority.  42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) (2016). 
 25. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2016); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1003 
(2017) (Regulation C). 
 26. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2016); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 25 (2017) 
(OCC regarding national banks); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 195 (2017) (OCC regarding federal savings 
associations); 12 C.F.R. Part 228 (2017) (Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 345 (2017) 
(FDIC). Within each federal banking regulator’s Chapter in the Code of Federal Regulations 
are virtually identical Parts and Subparts detailing the CRA provisions applicable to the 
depository institutions under the authority of the given regulator. The CRA regulatory text is 
virtually identical, regardless of regulator, across each of Subparts A (“General”), B 
(“Standards for Assessing Performance”) and C (“Records, Reporting and Disclosure 
Requirements”), and the paragraphs within each Subpart bear the same numbering sequence 
within the applicable Part related to each regulator. 
 27. The statute and implementing regulations apply to both depository and nondepository 
mortgage lending institutions that meet certain coverage criteria. 12 C.F.R. § 1003.1(c) 
(2017). 
 28. 12 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(iii) (2017).  The third, fair lending, purpose was added in 1989 
when the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation C “to incorporate amendments contained 
in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). 12 U.S.C. § 
1811 (2016).  The FIRREA amendments accomplished the following: expanded the coverage 
of HMDA to include mortgage lenders not affiliated with depository institutions or holding 
companies; required reporting of data regarding the disposition of applications for mortgage 
and home improvement loans in addition to data regarding loan originations and purchases; 
and required most lenders to identify the race, sex, and income of loan applicants and 
borrowers.  Lenders were also required to identify the class of purchaser for mortgage loans 
sold and were permitted to explain the basis for their lending decisions.  To facilitate the 
collection of this information, Regulation C requires a loan/application register (LAR) to be 
submitted by each institution.  The LAR allows institutions to log loan applications, loans 
originated, and loans purchased.” History of HMDA, FFIEC, https://www.ffiec.gov/hmd 
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implementing regulation, Regulation C, requires depository and 
nondepository originators of consumer-purpose, closed-end loans and 
open-end lines of credit that are secured by a dwelling to collect 
information on each credit applicant.  The institution’s HMDA data must 
be reported annually to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”),29 and is later reported to the public in aggregated form on the 
CFPB’s website each fall.  The publicly available information may be 
used by regulators, consumer advocacy groups, and others to perform 
regression analyses in order to identify potential fair lending issues.  If 
apparent disparities are identified, the credit originator is vulnerable to 
targeted fair lending examinations by regulators, enforcement actions by 
the CFPB, HUD or the DOJ, and private class action litigation. 
The genesis of the second related statute, the CRA, was to combat 
the potentially detrimental “redlining” policies of depository institutions 
that prohibited lending in minority neighborhoods.30  The Act encourages 
 
a/history2.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).  The CFPB promulgated the 2015 HMDA Final 
Rule (Rule) to further bolster this purpose.  The Rule modifies and adds numerous data fields 
and elements in an attempt to provide additional insight into characteristics of lenders and 
loan applicants and thereby better determine a lender’s compliance with fair lending laws. 80 
Fed. Reg. 66127 (Oct. 28, 2015), as corrected and amended Nov. 10, 2015, and Aug. 24, 2017.  
However, in conjunction with the recent change in CFPB leadership (see infra note 162), the 
CFPB issued an announcement on Dec. 21, 2017, stating that “it intends to open a rulemaking 
to reconsider various aspects of the Bureau’s 2015 HMDA [Final] [R]ule, such as the 
institutional and transactional coverage tests and the rule’s discretionary data points.” CFPB 
Issues Public Statement on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Compliance, Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau (Dec. 21, 2017),  https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-
public-statement-home-mortgage-disclosure-act-compliance/.  The FDIC followed suit on the 
same day, stating that with respect to its supervised institutions with less than $10 billion in 
assets (i.e., state-chartered, non-Federal Reserve-member depository institutions for which 
the CFPB does not have supervisory authority), it “does not intend to assess penalties with 
respect to errors in data collected in 2018 and reported in 2019.  Through this supervisory 
approach, FDIC examination staff will give credit to institutions’ good faith compliance 
efforts, and the approach will help institutions identify compliance weaknesses.”  FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL NO. 63-2017, HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT: STATEMENT ON 
INSTITUTIONS’ GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE EFFORTS (Dec. 21, 2017). 
 29. Under the 2015 HMDA Final Rule (see supra note 28), the CFPB will act as a 
centralized collection point and data repository, effective with the data submitted for calendar 
year 2017, regardless of whether the institution is subject to CFPB supervisory and 
enforcement authority (for example, a depository institution with less than $10 billion in 
assets is subject to supervision only by its prudential regulators and not by the CFPB, see infra 
note 54). See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FILING INSTRUCTIONS GUIDE FOR 
HMDA DATA COLLECTED IN 2017 (FIG) 5 (Aug. 2017).  Although the regulations prescribe 
transmission to the appropriate federal regulatory agency in 12 C.F.R. § 1003.1(c), the FIG 
clarifies that “[t]he HMDA agencies have agreed that filing HMDA data collected in or after 
2017 with the CFPB will be deemed submission to the appropriate Federal agency.” Id. 
 30. David Evan Cohen, The Community Reinvestment Act: Asset or Liability?, 75 MARQ. 
L. REV. 599, 601 (1992).  The term “redlining” is traditionally credited to sociologist John 
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depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities 
they serve, but—like HMDA—it does not prohibit discriminatory 
behavior.31  Nor is its focus solely on lending activity, as credits that count 
toward a desirable compliance rating may be obtained for non-lending 
activities such as community service and investment.32  Furthermore, the 
statute includes no mechanisms to enforce compliance.  Instead, the 
CRA’s primary incentives for compliance include proactive self-
protection against any adverse public attention that may result from a 
poor rating (also known as “reputational risk”),33 and a provision in the 
regulations whereby the bank’s CRA rating will be considered in the 
regulatory approval process related to any planned bank expansion, such 
as through the establishment of new branches or acquisitions and 
mergers.34 Interestingly, the CRA is the only statute of all of these to 
 
McKnight.  However, its traditional usage may also refer to the experience of a community 
activist who was once reportedly shown a map at a bank with literal red lines drawn around 
prohibited lending neighborhoods.  As explained in an article for the North Carolina Banking 
Institute, “The United States Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act [] after 
neighborhood activists presented evidence that banks were withdrawing credit from minority 
neighborhoods while continuing to take deposits from them . . . . Tom Fox, director of San 
Diego-based Normal Heights Community Development Corporation and one of the authors 
of the Act, stated that during his research in Chicago, a bank loan officer pulled a map out of 
a drawer and said he was not allowed to make loans in a neighborhood that had been clearly 
outlined in red.”  Joseph Moore, Note, Community Reinvestment Act and Its Impact on Bank 
Mergers, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 412, 412 (1997).  As exemplified in the BancorpSouth 
discussion at infra Part II.A.2, the disparate treatment redlining legal evidentiary standard that 
is the subject of this Article stands in contrast to this original concept of redlining. 
 31. See, e.g., Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1992) (“There 
is no language which suggests that the [CRA] was intended to prevent racially discriminatory 
lending policies or minority ‘redlining’. . . . Nor does the CRA’s legislative history reflect any 
congressional intent other than that of promoting sound community banking policy.”). 
 32. A depository financial institution’s CRA rating is based on a performance testing 
protocol in which test credits are assigned for various lending, service and investment 
activities.  Test credits need not be accumulated in each category, and an abundance of credits 
in one area may essentially serve to offset a lack of credits in another of the three testing areas.  
Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (2016).  Each federal banking regulator has 
its own Chapter/Parts/Subparts of the Code of Federal Regulations (Code).  12 C.F.R. Pt. 25 
(2017) (OCC regarding national banks); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 195 (2017) (OCC regarding federal 
savings associations); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 228 (217) (Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 345 
(2017) (FDIC). The regulations regarding the “Standards for Assessing Performance” are 
found in Subpart B of each applicable regulator’s Chapter and Part of the Code. 
 33. A CRA rating of Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial 
Noncompliance has been required to be made public since 1990.  12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) 
(2016).  The CRA report must be included as part of the “public file” at the bank’s 
headquarters.  The regulations regarding the contents of the public file are found in Subpart 
C ¶ 43 of each applicable regulator’s Chapter and Part of the Code. See supra note 26. 
 34. 12 C.F.R. § 25.29(a) (2017); 12 C.F.R. § 195.29(a) (2017); 12 C.F.R. § 228.29(a) 
(2017); 12 C.F.R. § 345.29(a) (2017).  Importantly for the purposes of this Article, the 
regulations also provide that, apart from strict compliance with the prescribed CRA testing 
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impose any affirmative duty, that being “to help meet the credit needs of 
the local community in which they are chartered, including low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods.”35 
C. What is Discrimination? 
There are three legal standards for proving discrimination: overt 
discrimination, disparate treatment, and disparate impact. 
The first of these standards, overt discrimination, involves—as 
the term suggests—blatant and obvious bias.  Because its nature makes 
overt discrimination easier to prove and eradicate, it has become 
“relatively uncommon.”36  The second standard, disparate treatment, is 
generally found where similarly situated individuals are treated 
 
protocol, the regulator’s “evaluation of a bank’s [overall] CRA performance is adversely 
affected by evidence of discriminatory or other illegal credit practices in any geography by 
the bank or in any assessment area by any affiliate whose loans have been considered as part 
of the bank’s lending performance.” (emphasis added).  12 C.F.R. §345.28(c) (2017).  It is 
because of this provision of the CRA that the regulatory approval of several proposed mergers 
or acquisitions were delayed the past few years due to regulatory concerns about redlining 
allegations.  See Rachel Louise Ensign, M&T Bank Completes Acquisition of Hudson City 
After 3-Year Delay, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Updated Nov. 2, 2015 8:28 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/m-t-bank-completes-acquisition-of-hudson-city-after-3-year-delay-
1446470410 (highlighting that, in the “longest delay ever for a U.S. deal valued at more than 
$1 billion, according to Dealogic,” “[t]he lender eventually settled with federal officials over 
allegations it intentionally withheld mortgages from minorities.”).  See also BancorpSouth 
Announces Extension of Merger Agreements with Central Community Corporation and 
Ouachita Bancshares Corp., PRNEWSIRE (Oct. 14, 2016, 7:13 AM) https://
www.streetinsider.com/Press+Releases/BancorpSouth+Announces+Extension+of+Merger+
Agreements+with+Central+Community+Corporation+and+Ouachita+Bancshares+Corp./
12132609.html (explaining that “the extension of our merger will provide adequate time to 
resolve remaining hurdles necessary to obtain regulatory approval”).  Even though 
BancorpSouth reached settlement with the CFPB on June 29, 2016, regarding the alleged fair 
lending violations, the mergers did not close until January 15, 2018. BancorpSouth Bank 
Receives Regulatory Approval for Mergers, PRNEWSWIRE (Dec. 27, 2017), https://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/bancorpsouth-bank-receives-regulatory-approval-for-
mergers-300575419.html. 
 35. 12 C.F.R. § 25.11(b)(1) (2017); 12 C.F.R. 195.11(b)(1) (2017); 12 C.F.R. § 
228.11(b)(1) (2017); 12 C.F.R. § 345.11(b)(1) (2017). Note that discussions are underway to 
revise the existing CRA regulations to “better align the benefits arising from banks’ CRA 
investments with the interest and needs of the communities that they service while also 
improving the supervisory and regulatory framework for CRA obligations.” John Heltman, 
Treasury Quietly Looking at Revamping CRA, AM. BANKER, July 10, 2017. 
 36. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 30 (stating “[o]vert evidence 
is relatively uncommon”). But see Complaint, United States v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 
1:16cv118-GHD-DAS  ¶¶ 99-112 (N. D. Miss. June 29, 2016), alleging overt discrimination 
¶¶ 88 – 98. See infra text accompanying note 116. 
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differently because of one or more prohibited-basis characteristics.37  The 
subject of this article—redlining—is a type of disparate treatment.38  
Finally, disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral policy results in 
a discriminatory effect on individuals of a protected class. This type of 
discrimination has been the topic of recent Supreme Court cases.39 
The concepts of disparate treatment and disparate impact are 
often confused or conflated.  As a legal standard, disparate treatment 
requires an intent to discriminate.40  However, it has become accepted 
that, in certain instances, intent may be implied by law, even absent proof 
of a discriminatory motive.  In such instances, the differing treatment 
itself becomes the proof of intent when there is no legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the disparate conduct.41  
During a regulatory examination or a review of documents 
produced for enforcement purposes in a disparate treatment matter, a 
loan-file-by-loan-file review is usually conducted to ascertain the 
treatment (application denial or approval) of pairs of individuals that are 
 
 37. Institutions should be mindful that, when provided opportunity to present a business 
necessity justification, “[i]f an agency determines that a lender’s explanation for treating some 
applicants differently is a pretext for discrimination, the agency may find that the lender 
discriminated, notwithstanding the lender’s explanation.” FDIC Policy Statement on 
Discrimination in Lending, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/ 
rules/5000-3860.html. 
 38. See infra Part II. This article will distinguish the traditional concept of redlining 
exemplified in supra note 30 from the new, more nuanced approach. 
 39. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. 
Ct. 2507, 2511 (2015) (narrowly holding “that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under 
the Fair Housing Act,” but setting forth in dicta a burden-shifting process for the evidentiary 
process by which a disparate-impact claim may be proven).  See also Bank of America Corp. 
et al. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1298 (2017) (holding that the city of Miami is an 
“aggrieved person” authorized to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act). The disparate-impact 
legal standard of proof is not the primary subject of this Article.  No disparate treatment cases 
in the residential mortgage context that is the subject of this Article have been tried by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 40. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, United States v. 
Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. June 5, 2017) (discussed infra Part II.A.1) 
(quoting Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010), averring that “[p]roof of 
discriminatory purpose is crucial for a disparate treatment claim” and Ave. 6E Invs, LLC v. 
City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 2016), arguing that “[t]o state a facially 
plausible claim for disparate treatment, the government must allege facts demonstrating ‘that 
a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated’” the defendant). 
 41. Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) 
(“Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from 
the mere fact of differences in treatment.”).  The DOJ uses this argument in its Memorandum 
in Opposition to KleinBank’s Motion to Dismiss.  Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 11, United States v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. 
June 5, 2017).  See discussion of Klein Bank case at infra Part II.A. 
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otherwise “matched” in non-prohibited-basis characteristics.42  Because 
such a loan file review is not appropriate for the scrutiny of disparate 
treatment in the pre-application phase,43 the CFPB has recently begun to 
use “mystery shoppers” in order to ferret out differences in the ways in 
which applicants might be encouraged or discouraged to apply for credit, 
or otherwise be aided through the application process, by an institution’s 
loan originators or other employees or agents.44 
As further explained below, an allegation of the redlining form of 
disparate treatment is based, not on the potential borrower’s individual 
characteristics, but on the characteristics of the individuals residing in a 
geographic area as a whole.45  Proof of such redlining allegations need 
not rely on a clear delineation of an institution’s intentional service areas, 
as was the case with traditional redlining, but instead may be based on 
statistical indicators of avoidance of certain geographic areas or less 
favorable treatment of high-minority areas over non-minority areas.46 
In contrast to the disparate treatment legal evidentiary standard, 
intent is completely irrelevant in the context of a disparate impact claim.47  
 
 42. This type of review is commonly referred to as “matched-pair analysis,” in which 
underwriting criteria, such as credit score, debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, etc., are 
used to identify instances in which “similarly qualified prohibited basis and control group 
applicants had different credit outcomes . . . .”  FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra 
note 9, at 20.  Financial regulatory agency examiners perform such a review in their 
supervisory capacity.  However, the DOJ and HUD do not have the same type of access to 
file-by-file detail in their enforcement capacity, absent a document production request.  
Consequently, the DOJ and HUD focus the initial analysis that is conducted during an agency-
initiated enforcement investigation (i.e., as distinct from a matter that was referred by the 
regulatory agency, as detailed further at infra Part I.D) on publicly available HMDA data. 
 43. Loan files will not exist prior to application. 
 44. Complaint, United States v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 1:16cv118-GHD-DAS ¶¶ 99–
112 (N.D. Miss. June 29, 2016) (describing the instances allegedly witnessed by mystery 
shoppers).  This tactic has been used routinely in HUD investigations of residential rental and 
real estate sales transactions, but this is the first instance in which mystery shoppers were used 
by the CFPB. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice Action 
Requires Bancorpsouth to Pay $10.6 Million to Address Discrimination Mortgage Lending 
Practices, CONS. FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (June 29, 2016), https://www.consumerfina 
nce.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-department-justice-
action-requires-bancorpsouth-pay-106-million-address-discriminatory-mortgage-lending-
practices/  (stating that “[t]his is the CFPB’s first use of testing, sometimes referred to as 
‘mystery shopping,’ to support an allegation of discrimination.”). 
 45. See infra Part II. 
 46. See, e.g., FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 10–11, 35–36. 
 47. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2511 (2015) (reasoning that the “results-oriented ‘otherwise make unavailable’” language in 
the FHAct as it was applied in the Supreme Court opinions deciding other disparate-impact 
claims “refers to the consequences of an action rather than the actor’s intent.”  See also id. at 
2513 explicitly contrasting the “disparate-impact theory of liability” with “a disparate-
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The disparate impact standard is applicable when a facially neutral policy 
or practice has a demonstrated disproportionate effect on a protected 
class, as opposed to a lone protected individual.  A 2015 U. S. Supreme 
Court case set forth in dicta a burden-shifting framework for proving 
disparate impact in the context of an alleged violation of the FHAct.48  
First, in order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must identify a 
specific, facially neutral policy and demonstrate a robust causal 
relationship of this policy to the discriminatory effect.  The Court stated 
that a showing of statistical disparities alone is not sufficient to establish 
a disparate impact claim, and further reasoned that “policies are not 
contrary to the [disparate impact] requirement unless they are artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”49  Once the robust causality 
requirement has been met, the burden then shifts to the defendant to state 
and prove a business necessity.  In particular, the Court was concerned 
that the entity must be free “to make the practical business choices and 
profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise 
system.”50  Once the defendant has met that hurdle, the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff, requiring proof that a less discriminatory alternative exists 
that will “serve[] the [entity’s] legitimate needs.”51 
D. Who Polices Fair Lending? 
There are several ways a fair lending enforcement case can be 
commenced.  For depository institutions with less than $10 billion in 
assets, the primary enforcement authority rests with the federal prudential 
regulator.  It is only when this prudential regulator has reason to believe 
that a pattern or practice of discriminatory lending behavior52 exists in 
 
treatment case, where a ‘plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent 
or motive’” (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U. S. 557, 577 (2009)). 
 48. Id.  Many industry legal practitioners are skeptical of the applicability of the 
disparate-impact theory of liability in a claim brought only under the ECOA and not under 
the FHAct.  See, e.g., Eileen Grey, Paul F. Hancock, Ken Markison, Jeffrey Naimon, Michael 
Skojec, July 21, 2015 Mortgage Bankers Association webinar: Disparate Impact: Implications 
of the Supreme Court Ruling (Jul. 21, 2015) (averring that “[s]ome of the Court’s reasons for 
upholding disparate impact – such as the legislative history and the uniform appellate court 
decisions – will not apply to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)”). 
 49. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524. 
 50. Id. at 2518. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Such a “pattern or practice” belief is based on findings that result from a targeted fair 
lending examination, which can include a review of HMDA data.  FED. FIN. INSTS. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9 (“Procedures”), at 22  (discussing throughout that the 
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violation of ECOA that the regulator is obligated by law to refer the 
matter to the DOJ for further investigation.53  For all nondepository 
financial institutions, and for depository institutions with $10 billion or 
more in assets, the CFPB has primary responsibility for fair lending 
enforcement.54  The CFPB also has discretion as to whether to partner 
with the DOJ in any CFPB enforcement investigation and subsequent 
litigation, or to pursue the matter further on its own.55 
When a prudential regulator or the CFPB finds reason to believe 
there has been a pattern or practice of behavior in violation of the FHAct, 
a referral must be made to HUD,56 which must, by law, respond. HUD 
 
examiner is looking for evidence to establish a “pattern or practice” of discriminatory 
behavior by the lender). Note that there is a common tendency by smaller banks in particular 
to conflate a targeted fair lending examination with a compliance examination or a CRA 
examination.  See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8–10, 
U.S. v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. June 5, 2017) (arguing in opposition 
to the DOJ’s claim that a targeted fair lending examination had not been conducted by 
claiming that the FDIC’s ordinary compliance and CRA examinations followed the 
Procedures and were therefore sufficient to establish that there had been no discovery of fair 
lending violations by the FDIC). Because of the multiple redactions throughout the Motion to 
Dismiss text, it is difficult to determine if such a targeted examination had been conducted. 
However, p. iv of the Procedures and institutional experience suggests that an examination 
conducted pursuant to the Procedures is undertaken only on a targeted basis once there has 
been a strong suspicion of fair lending risk by the regulatory agency conducting a routine 
compliance or CRA examination. See also Memorandum in Opposition to KleinBank’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 20, US v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. June 5, 
2017) explaining the typical FDIC examination process (clarifying, based on the text of the 
Procedures, that “the FDIC does not review all banks for redlining at each examination. . . . 
The FDIC’s examination procedures plainly state that even where one or more redlining ‘risk 
factor[s]’ is present, a redlining analysis is not mandatory”). 
 53. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16(b)(3) (2017).  See 
also Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (2016). The DOJ is the federal 
government law enforcement agency tasked with enforcing federal civil rights laws. 28 C.F.R. 
§ 0.50 (2017). See also discussion accompanying infra note 62 listing the factors considered 
by the DOJ in deciding whether to litigate or send the matter back to the prudential regulator 
for administrative resolution (or, if the matter did not originate with a referral, close the 
investigation). With respect to referrals to the DOJ by a prudential regulator, or coordination 
between a regulatory agency and the DOJ or HUD, “[t]he [a]gencies will coordinate their 
enforcement actions and make every effort to eliminate unnecessarily duplicative actions. 
Where both a federal financial institution[] regulatory agency and either DOJ or HUD are 
contemplating taking actions under their own respective authorities, the [a]gencies will seek 
to coordinate their actions to ensure that each agency’s action is consistent and 
complementary.” FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 37. 
 54. The scope of CFPB supervision authority is set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 5514 (as to 
nondepository institutions) and § 5515 (regarding “very large” depository institutions). 
 55. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REGARDING FAIR LENDING COORDINATION (Dec. 6, 2012). 
 56. See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 37 (stating that a “pattern or practice” 
FHAct violation “must be referred to HUD”). Financial regulatory agencies have no authority 
  
80 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 22 
can choose to handle the referral by administrative action or it can refer 
the matter to the DOJ.57  In addition, individuals or advocacy groups can 
register complaints directly with the DOJ or HUD, which may then 
choose whether to investigate and pursue the matter further, or close the 
complaint without action. 
The DOJ may also initiate a fair lending case on its own.  
Although the DOJ seems careful to avoid public disclosure of the 
frequency with which this happens,58 anecdotally, it seems to be 
happening with more regularity.59  By way of example, the KleinBank 
case, discussed below, did not originate with a referral from the bank’s 
federal prudential regulator, the FDIC.60 61 One possible explanation for 
the perceived proliferation of DOJ-initiated cases may be that the DOJ’s 
recent emphasis on the use of statistical comparisons of a subject 
institution’s lending activity to the HMDA-reported behavior of members 
of a DOJ-selected peer group has enabled it to target additional 
institutions for investigation from among the statistical outliers it 
observed during its peer-group-determination process.  
 
to enforce the FHAct. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2016) (opining that “[t]he authority and 
responsibility for administering [the FHAct] shall be in the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development.”). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2016) (outlining HUD administrative enforcement generally and, 
in sub-section 3610(e), referral to the DOJ); 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (2016) (prescribing 
enforcement by the DOJ). 
 58. As discussed further in the text accompanying infra note 62, the DOJ submits a report 
to Congress annually regarding the prior year’s ECOA activities. Significant difficulties were 
encountered when trying to reconcile non-referral matters from year to year, likely due to the 
discretion necessary to avoid unintentional disclosure of non-public DOJ-initiated 
investigatory matters. 
 59. In addition to the KleinBank matter discussed in the next sentence, the DOJ 
investigation that resulted in a combined Union Savings Bank/Guardian Savings Bank 
complaint and consent order does not appear to have been initiated by referral from the banks’ 
respective prudential regulatory agencies, given the lack of mention of a regulatory referral 
in the complaint and consent order. (Union Savings Bank is chartered by the state of Ohio and 
the FDIC is its federal prudential regulator. Guardian Savings Bank is regulated by the OCC 
due to its charter as a federal savings bank. Because the banks share common ownership and 
management, the complaint and consent order are each a joint document applicable to both 
banks but which address the issues alleged with respect to each individual bank.) See 
generally, Complaint, United States v. Union Savings Bank, No. 1:16CV1172 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 28, 2016). 
 60. The apparent lack of prior concern by the FDIC with the bank’s residential mortgage 
lending practices consumes much of the argument in the bank’s Motion to Dismiss. See infra 
Part II.A. See also supra note 52 (discussing elements of the FDIC’s supervisory process with 
respect to KleinBank). 
 61. This is the first residential mortgage fair lending matter to be litigated under this 
contemporary disparate treatment redlining theory, rather than settled. See generally infra 
chart accompanying note 87. 
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In evaluating whether to pursue potential litigation or return the 
matter to the regulator for administrative resolution (or close the matter 
if there was no regulatory agency referral), the DOJ cites its consideration 
of several factors.62  In general, referrals are most likely to be returned to 
the regulatory agency (or the matter dropped in the case of a DOJ-
initiated investigation) when the following characteristics are present: 
 
• the bank has ended the practice and there is “little chance that it will 
be repeated”; 
  
• the violation was likely “accidental or arose from ignorance of the 
law’s more technical requirements,” such as spousal signature 
violations; or 
 
• the matter involved “either . . . few potential victims or de minimis 
harm to any potential victims.”63 
  
To the contrary, the DOJ will likely retain a referral or initiate an 
independent investigation when the aforementioned criteria are not 
present and at least one of the following characteristics applies: 
  
• the practice has “serious . . .  potential for either financial or 
emotional harm to members of protected classes”; 
  
• only court action is likely to cause cessation of the practice; 
 
• the victims harmed by the practice “cannot be fully compensated 
without court action”; 
  
• “damages for victims, beyond out-of-pocket losses” are seen as a 
necessary deterrent to prevent the lender “or others like it” from 
viewing “the cost of detection” as merely a “cost of doing business”; 
or  
 
• the observed practice is believed by the DOJ to be “sufficiently 
common in the lending industry, or raises an important issue, so as 
to require action to deter lenders.”64 
  
 
 62. U.S. Attorney General, 2016 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 12–13 (Sep. 2017). These factors were first 
communicated in 1996 upon recommendation of the Government Accountability Office as 
“guidance to the federal bank regulatory agencies on pattern or practice referrals.” Id. 
 63. Id. at 12. 
 64. Id. 
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Interestingly, in the case of every referral received from a bank 
regulatory agency since December 2012, the DOJ met its goal of 
completing its review and making its determination to proceed or return 
the matter within 60 days of the date of referral.65  The decision process 
to litigate or close a fair lending investigation undertaken without referral 
does not appear to move as quickly.66 
II. WHAT IS REDLINING? 
The Federal Financial Institution Examination Council’s 
Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures, used by the 
regulatory agencies to guide agency examiners through the examination 
process,67 describes redlining as “a form of illegal disparate treatment in 
which a financial institution provides unequal access to credit, or unequal 
terms of credit,” based on the prohibited-basis characteristics of residents 
of the geographic area “in which the credit seeker resides or will reside 
or in which the residential property to be mortgaged is located.”68  Cited 
examples of redlining behavior by an institution include failing or 
refusing to extend credit, or otherwise discouraging applications, in a 
certain area on a prohibited basis; targeting of those areas with less 
advantageous products (sometimes referred to as “reverse redlining”); or 
omitting or excluding such areas from the institution’s efforts to market 
its residential loan products.  It is important to note that these examples 
include both passive behavior (i.e., a failure to extend credit) and 
affirmative activity (i.e., a refusal to extend credit).69  This equal focus on 
passive behavior appears to be reflected in the recent trend of using 
statistical comparisons as between the subject institution and its “peers” 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. By way of example, “on May 21, 2015, the [DOJ] informed KleinBank that it had 
initiated an investigation into potential lending discrimination by the Bank,” yet the complaint 
was not filed until Jan. 13, 2017.  Complaint at 1, United States v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 
(RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. Jan 13, 2017).  Arguably, the DOJ investigation took some period of 
time (which time interval would not be relevant in the case of a referral to DOJ following a 
regulatory examination), and it is also quite likely that KleinBank and the DOJ negotiated at 
length prior to KleinBank’s declination of any DOJ settlement offer. Still, the time from 
initiation of the investigation to filing of the complaint spans nearly twenty months. 
 67. See supra Part I.D (discussing the agencies that perform fair lending examinations). 
 68. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at iv. 
 69. Id. at 10–11. 
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to allege a redlining violation, and has been the object of industry scorn.70  
It can be argued, however, that such an approach merely reinforces the 
regulation’s prohibition on discouraging access to credit, reasoning that 
a potential applicant may be deemed to have been discouraged from 
application solely because the potential applicant was unaware of the 
availability of credit.71 
The distinguishing characteristic of disparate treatment redlining, 
as contrasted with disparate treatment that results from an individualized, 
“matched-pair”72 assessment, is that, here, the discriminatory conduct is 
directed toward an entire geographic area, regardless of whether an 
individual applicant or potential applicant may be qualified to enter a 
credit transaction.  In other words, instead of a comparison of different 
treatment as between individuals,73 the focus now is on geography, and 
whether the institution has limited the access to credit, passively or 
actively, based on the prohibited-basis characteristics (usually race or 
national origin) of that area, despite the fact that there may be qualified 
borrowers residing, or wanting to purchase property, in those areas. 
Although the disparate treatment redlining approach has been 
used in recent consent orders,74 it has not yet been fully litigated in the 
courts.75  That said, one way in which the regulatory and enforcement 
agencies attempt to “prove” disparate treatment redlining is through a 
record of mortgage lending HMDA data that shows statistically 
 
 70. See, e.g., Andrew L. Sandler, Jeffrey P. Naimon, Andrea K. Mitchell, Redlining 
Cases in 2015 and a New Discrimination Standard, LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2016, 10:03 AM) 
[hereinafter SANDLER] (opining that “[t]he government’s use of the term ‘redlining’ in its 
current wave of fair-lending enforcement, which has focused on statistics related to 
geographic lending patterns, is a misuse of that term”). See also Paul F. Hancock, BankThink: 
Trump has opportunity to restore balance in fair lending cases, AM. BANKER 2, Feb. 7, 2017 
(arguing that the “explosive application of ‘redlining’ claims” is an “overreach” that has 
“morphed far beyond the original invidious practice of drawing a ‘red line’ to exclude 
minority neighborhoods from a business plan” to legal challenges that arise “simply because 
[the subject bank] did not distribute loans between minority and nonminority neighborhood[s] 
in the same proportion as the aggregate of all other lenders.” Mr. Hancock deduces that “[b]y 
definition, this means approximately one-half of lenders are always ‘redlining.’”). 
 71. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.4(b) (2017) (stating that “[a] creditor shall not make any oral 
or written statement, in advertising or otherwise, to applicants or prospective applicants that 
would discourage on a prohibited basis a reasonable person from making or pursuing an 
application”). 
 72. See discussion of “matched-pair” analysis supra note 42. 
 73. See discussion accompanying supra notes 42 and 44, on loan-level file comparisons 
and the use of mystery shoppers. 
 74. See, e.g., Joe Rodriguez, CFPB’s New Approach to Redlining Analysis is Put Into 
Action, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:35 PM) (observing that “the CFPB has a new approach”). 
 75. See supra note 61 and discussion of the KleinBank case, infra Part II.A.1. 
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significant disparities in comparison to similar lenders.76  The inference 
by the agencies is that if peer lenders77 are taking applications or 
originating loans78 in high-minority areas, there must be no legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the subject institution to draw fewer 
applications or originate fewer loans from that same geographic area.79  
This inference, of course, diminishes the importance of other intervening 
 
 76. See Maureen Yap, Fair Lending Webinar: Questions and Answers, Cons. 
Compliance Outlook (Oct. 17, 2012), https://consumercomplianceoutlook.org/2013/second-
quarter/fair-lending-webinar/ (documenting, on behalf of the Non-Discrimination Working 
Group of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, answers to questions most frequently 
asked during the Outlook Live webinar titled “Fair Lending Hot Topics,” as well as other 
frequent questions received by the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve). “Generally, the 
Federal Reserve evaluates a bank’s HMDA data relative to similar lenders in the bank’s CRA 
assessment area or reasonably expected market area. More specifically, the Federal Reserve 
typically reviews whether there is a statistically significant disparity between a bank’s 
mortgage applications and originations in majority-minority census tracts compared with the 
adjusted aggregate of similar lenders. The “adjusted aggregate” is typically defined as lenders 
with lending activity that is between 50 and 200 percent of the bank’s volume and with a rate 
spread incidence of less than 25 percent, but it may be adjusted further based on the bank’s 
business model.”).  See also Complaint, United States v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/
FLN), ¶¶ 33-34 (D. Minn. Jan 13, 2017) (alleging that “a smaller proportion of HMDA-
reportable residential mortgage loans in majority-minority tracts relative to comparable 
lenders . . . show a statistically significant failure by KleinBank to provide loan services for 
dwellings located in majority-minority tracts”). However, it can be argued that, despite the 
distinctions between the disparate treatment redlining and disparate impact legal standards, 
U.S. Supreme Court analysis regarding the appropriate use of statistical analyses in disparate 
impact cases also may be applicable in the disparate treatment context. Such an argument 
would assert that, as in the disparate impact case of Inclusive Communities, unless there is a 
robust causal connection to the alleged disparity, statistical analysis alone is not sufficient to 
prove a prima facie case. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2017) (explaining that “[a] disparate-impact 
claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s 
policy or policies causing that disparity. A robust causality requirement is important in 
ensuring that defendants do not resort to the use of racial quotas”). See also SANDLER, supra 
note 70 (opining that “the use of superficial peer analyses as the[] principal evidence in 
bringing ‘redlining’ discrimination cases . . . [is a] misuse of statistics . . . [that] is directly 
inconsistent with the position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in . . . “Inclusive 
Communities”). 
 77. See supra, note 76, explaining the interagency regulatory approach to the 
determination of an appropriate peer group. However, as discussed infra note 175, the best 
practice is for the lender to proactively determine (and defend, as necessary) a peer group, 
considering all relevant competitive and other information as to which a regulator may not be 
aware. 
 78. Some recent complaints have alleged violations as to both originations and 
applications, whereas other cases have focused only on one or the other, but not both. See, 
e.g., infra case studies in Part II.A. 
 79. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 38 (suggesting that “an 
institution’s inactivity in an underserved area where its acknowledged competitors are active 
would tend to support the interpretation that [the subject institution] intends to avoid doing 
business in that area. Conversely, if [the subject institution] is as active as other institutions 
that would suggest that it intends to compete for, rather than avoid, business in the area.”). 
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competitive factors that may result in the subject institution’s lower 
application or origination rates.80  
An additional concept somewhat related to disparate treatment 
redlining, that of disparate marketing treatment, has become a focus in 
recent fair lending examinations and consent orders.  The disparate 
marketing treatment concept imposes an affirmative obligation to market 
or advertise in certain geographic areas, or to certain segments of the 
population, even though there is no such proven legal duty (and despite 
any justifiable assessment by the institution that such efforts will be 
unlikely to produce a sufficient return on the marketing or advertising 
expenditure).81  The interconnectedness between disparate treatment 
redlining and disparate marketing treatment arguably flows, yet again, 
from the provision in ECOA that prohibits institutions from discouraging 
protected applicants and potential applicants from seeking access to 
credit.82  The premise behind using an institution’s marketing, or lack of 
marketing, efforts to allege disparate treatment is that marketing 
decisions are affirmative, i.e., deliberate, acts to include or exclude areas 
on the basis of prohibited characteristics.  The deliberateness helps prove 
the necessary “intent” element of disparate treatment.83  
The interagency guidance checklist used by regulatory agency 
examiners in the review of disparate marketing treatment behavior 
suggests that examiners look for advertising patterns or practices that a 
reasonable person would believe indicates an institution’s perception that 
prohibited-basis customers are less desirable than those without such 
 
 80. For example, larger banks with a more predominant presence or more advertising 
money are likely better able to penetrate any particular market; there may be a limited 
population of qualifying prospective borrowers, and these individuals are captured by other 
institution(s) for any variety of reasons; the subject bank may have legitimate business reasons 
that limit the variety of its product offerings; or the subject institution’s business model may 
be predicated on a different loan delivery channel. 
 81. Although 12 C.F.R. 1002.4(b) prohibits discouragement in advertising based on 
protected characteristics, there is no affirmative marketing or advertising obligation expressly 
stated in either the statute or the implementing regulation. 
 82. Observe that the instructions to examiners regarding the review of marketing efforts 
with respect to certain population segments or geographies is found in a separate section from 
redlining in the Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures, and the disparate 
marketing treatment charge is usually a separate allegation in a judicial complaint. See, e.g., 
FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9 (listing “Analysis of Potential 
Discriminatory Marketing Practices” as its own, separate, section in the Table of Contents 
(Part III § H, 38–40), which immediately follows the “Analysis of Potential Discriminatory 
‘Redlining’” section (Part III § G, 29–38). 
 83. See supra Part I.C for discussion of an “intent” requirement. 
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characteristics, such as:  (1) restriction of institutional advertising to only 
media that serve a particular racial or national origin market segment; (2) 
marketing efforts that are undertaken by brokers or agents known to the 
institution to serve only one racial or national origin group; or (3) 
instances where the proportion of prohibited-basis applicants is 
significantly lower than that group’s representation in the total population 
of the institution’s market area.84 
Unfortunately, smaller community banks in particular can 
unwittingly find themselves under suspicion of disparate marketing 
treatment merely because they do not have a cohesive or well-considered 
marketing and advertising strategy.  Furthermore, the institution may 
view itself as serving a particular niche market, and indeed may have been 
chartered on such a premise.  In this situation, marketing and advertising 
spending likely is intentionally focused on those areas where the 
institution might reasonably be expected to get the “most bang for its 
buck,” without consideration of any possible fair lending implications.  
However, such an unintentional oversight may place an institution 
squarely in the cross-hairs of a deemed ECOA violation, in that the 
institution did not provide equal access to credit because it did not make 
certain segments of protected individuals aware of their possible credit 
opportunities with the institution.85  As an example, a recent DOJ 
complaint against Union Bank alleged that the bank took “inadequate 
steps” to spend its (limited) marketing budget on reaching minorities and 
further did not “monitor the effectiveness of its marketing efforts in 






 84. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 11–12, 39–40. 
 85. See supra Part I.B.1, explaining ECOA “discouragement” principles. 
 86. Complaint, United States v. Union Savings Bank, No. 1:16CV1172, ¶ 43 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 28, 2016). 
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As demonstrated in the above table,87 the pace of redlining 
settlements has been increasing rapidly over the past few years.  Given 
the recent change in presidential administrations, it is difficult to know 
whether this trend will continue.88  That said, the DOJ’s Civil Rights 
Division Annual Report to Congress reported that the DOJ had seven 
open redlining investigations at the end of 2016.89  
A. Selected Case Studies 
1. KleinBank 
The most recent redlining complaint was filed on January 13, 
2017, just one week prior to a change in presidential administration from 
one that had been very proactive in civil-rights issues to one whose views 
 
 87. BROOKS F. BOSSONG, NEXSEN PRUET LLP; MARSHA J. COURCHANE, CHARLES RIVER 
ASSOCIATES; BRIAN C. MCCORMALLY, ARNOLD & PORTER; JAMES W. STEVENS, TROUTMAN 
SANDERS LLP; MARTHA J. SVOBODA, POYNER SPRUILL LLP, PRESENTATION AT 2017 UNC 
LAW BANKING INSTITUTE (Mar. 23-24) [hereinafter 2017 BANKING INSTITUTE PRESENTATION]. 
 88. See discussion accompanying infra note 90. 
 89. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 62, at 2. The DOJ is required to file a report 
regarding its enforcement under ECOA, the FHAct and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 
each September based on the prior calendar year’s activity. The count of seven open cases 
appears to include the KleinBank matter. There were no noteworthy public allegations of 
disparate treatment redlining activity in 2017. 
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have not yet been clearly articulated.90  The complaint alleged at a high 
level, as do many complaints, that KleinBank “structur[ed] its residential 
mortgage lending business so as to avoid serving the credit needs of 
neighborhoods where a majority of residents are individuals of racial and 
ethnic minorities.”91  Interestingly, KleinBank is the only financial 
institution to have decided to litigate, rather than settle, charges of fair 
lending violations.92  One speculative theory is that the bank’s decision 
to fight was emboldened by the change in administration.93 
A more likely reason for the decision to litigate rather than settle 
may be that the bank believes both the facts and the law are on its side.  
As noted previously, some of the arguments used to allege disparate 
treatment redlining in prior consent orders have not been tested in the 
courts.  For example, the allegations against KleinBank include having 
no branch locations in majority-minority neighborhoods, 94 excluding 
majority-minority neighborhoods from the bank’s marketing efforts,95 
having a disproportionately low rate of applications from majority-
minority neighborhoods,96 and having a disproportionately low rate of 
originations in majority-minority neighborhoods.97  There are no statutes, 
 
 90. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Jeff’s Law: The Attorney General Sees His Roles as Pushing 
Present-Day Law Enforcement Toward a Rose-colored Past, ABA JOURNAL, October 2017, 
at 61 (noting the ways in which “he has reversed significant civil rights policies adopted by 
the Obama administration”). 
 91. Complaint at 1, United States v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. 
Jan. 13, 2017). The term “avoid” is a clear reference to ECOA discouragement, although FHA 
violations (which are more generalized) are also alleged.  “Discouragement” may connote an 
affirmative act, as opposed to inaction. 
 92. As regards complaints filed by each of the CFPB, DOJ and HUD in which redlining 
was a central issue, no other defendant parties to-date have challenged the allegations in court, 
but have instead agreed to a negotiated consent order settlement. See, e.g., table 
accompanying supra note 87. 
 93. In answer to the speculation that a DOJ led by U.S. Attorney General Jefferson 
Sessions III may not take quite as active an interest in new fair lending cases, let alone those 
still sitting in the pipeline, it is interesting that the DOJ’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
KleinBank’s Motion to Dismiss, dated August 25, 2017, was signed by U.S. Attorney General 
Jefferson Sessions III. See also John L. Culhane, Jr., DOJ Issues Annual Report to Congress 
on 2016 ECOA/FHA/SCRA Enforcement Activities,  CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (Sept. 28, 
2017),  https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/09/28/doj-issues-annual-report-
tocongress-on-2016-ecoafhascra-enforcement-activities/ (observing that “although [the 
annual report] concludes by noting the role of the DOJ’s ‘vigorous enforcement of fair lending 
laws’ in expanding credit access, it is unclear how the DOJ will carry out that role under the 
leadership of Attorney General Jeff Sessions”). 
 94. Complaint, United States v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN), ¶¶ 22–25. 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 26 – 27. 
 96. Id. ¶¶ 28 – 32. 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 33 – 35. 
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regulations, or case law that obligate a financial institution to 
affirmatively solicit mortgage applications to or originate  mortgages 
from any particular population segment or geographic area.98  In addition, 
the reliance on statistical analysis of a subject institution’s performance 
in terms of applications or originations when compared to a group of peer 
institutions to prove disparate treatment has not been judicially 
challenged.99  Competitive market forces, and other differences such as 
the size of the banks, the short- and long-term business models of the 
various banks, and their product offerings, may well explain the 
differences in penetration rates, which might consequently preclude any 
correlation to intentional discriminatory behavior.100 
In its additional allegation that the bank used a “discriminatory 
CRA assessment area,”101 the DOJ invented new terminology when it 
referred in its complaint to the geographic areas as to which it believes 
the bank’s performance should be measured. The DOJ drew a new area 
for measurement of application and origination activity, which it termed 
the “Proper Assessment Area.”102  It distinguished that area from the 
bank’s CRA assessment area, dubbed by the DOJ as the “narrower market 
area.”103  
 
 98. The only affirmative obligation in the fair lending and related statues is the obligation 
in the CRA “to help meet the credit needs of the local community in which they are chartered, 
including low-and moderate-income neighborhoods.” Supra Part I.A.3; see also ¶ 11(b)(1) of 
each of the applicable Parts in Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as explained in 
supra note 26. 
 99. As previously observed, this is the first such case to challenge this legal standard 
regarding evidence of disparate treatment redlining. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 17, US v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. June 5, 
2017) (arguing  that “[t]he government’s statistical allegations do not resuscitate its claim,” 
citing Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823,  833,  which averred that “evidence of impact alone 
is not sufficient to state a claim for disparate treatment unless the evidence is ‘so stark and 
unexplainable on other grounds to justify, on its own, an inference of discriminatory 
purpose’”). 
 100. See, e.g., 2017 BANKING INSTITUTE PRESENTATION,  supra note 87. The failure to 
account for competitive market forces and other differences to explain discrepancies in market 
penetration becomes more problematic when a new “Proper Assessment Area” is drawn to 
include areas in which the bank has no market presence, but is instead deemed remiss for not 
having more properly sought business there. See discussion in the following paragraph 
regarding determination of the geographic areas as to which the institution’s performance 
should “properly” be assessed. 
 101. Complaint at 5, United States v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. 
Jan 13, 2017). . 
 102. Id. ¶ 29. 
 103. Id. ¶ 32. 
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While a bank might be expected under certain circumstances to 
perform its internal fair lending analysis using different geographic 
boundaries than those used for CRA assessment purposes,104 the 
designation of the DOJ’s market area as “proper” in comparison to the 
bank’s “narrower” area seems somewhat pejorative.105  This is 
particularly so, given that the regulatory agencies have generally settled 
on the use of the term “reasonably expected market area” (“REMA”) to 
describe the geographic areas in which a lender engages in a relatively 
high volume of mortgage activity.106  The REMAs are distinguished from 
the CRA assessment areas due primarily to the differences in statutory 
purpose.  REMAs are intended for use in fair lending analysis, whereas 
CRA assessment areas define the boundaries within which the bank’s 
depository facilities are located and as to which, under the CRA, the bank 
has certain lending, service, or investment obligations to individuals of 
low-to-moderate income.107 
The unique litigation posture of this case provides valuable 
insight into the potential development of the applicable legal standards.  
In its motion to dismiss, the bank argues that reliance by the DOJ on the 
overall prohibited-basis composition of a census tract108 to prove 
discrimination is unsupportable, since it cannot be proven “whether 
 
 104. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 32 (explaining that the 
redlining analysis should focus on geographic areas where “the institution actually marketed 
and provided credit and where it could reasonably be expected to have marketed and provided 
credit . . . [which] might be beyond or otherwise different from the CRA assessment area”). 
See additional discussion at infra note 107. 
 105. However, it is in plaintiff’s interest to assert any and all plausible arguments against 
the defendant. 
 106. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 32. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that this concept of a REMA is not a regulatory construct, but merely has 
been suggested in fair lending examination guidance. 
 107. Also observe that with respect to any REMA, the bank here did not have a history of 
mortgage originations outside of its CRA assessment area. This fact pattern stands in contrast 
to banks that utilize a wide network of third-party originators apart from or in addition to retail 
loan originators. It is this third-party-origination business model for which the REMA concept 
is most appropriate. The third-party-origination business model may become more prevalent 
as banks seek to find new sources of non-deposit-based income. See supra note 32 (regarding 
the lending, service, and investment components of an institution’s CRA rating). 
 108. Observe that “‘[m]ajority-minority’ census tracts are those in which over fifty percent 
(50%) of the residents are of a minority race, ethnicity or national origin. ‘Majority-white’ 
census tracts are those in which over fifty percent (50%) of the residents are non-Hispanic 
whites.”  Complaint, US v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN), ¶ 4 n. 1 (D. Minn. Jan 13, 
2017). 
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minorities owned . . . dwellings,”109 and furthermore the DOJ argument 
does not “differentiate[] between individuals in the majority-minority 
census tract[].”110  KleinBank also asserts that there has been no 
discriminatory behavior because the statistical analysis, which is based 
on geographic areas, does “not establish that the actual minority residents 
in these census tracts faced a disproportionately adverse effect,” and in 
fact does “not demonstrate that individuals in a protected class suffered 
any adverse impact at all.”111  KleinBank further avers that “[i]f anything, 
the [DOJ] alleges discrimination as to the entire majority-minority census 
tract, which is not a protected class.”112  
The DOJ countered this aspect of KleinBank’s theory of the case 
in its opposition memorandum, stating that “[c]ourts have confirmed that 
discrimination in residential lending based on the racial and/or ethnic 
characteristics of a neighborhood generally, rather than necessarily on the 
race or ethnicity of a particular borrower, is discrimination because of 
race or national origin in violation of the FHA and ECOA.”113 
But perhaps more importantly, the judge’s decision on the motion 
to dismiss may turn on the procedural significance of this particular stage 
of the case.  The defendant’s motion to dismiss will fail if there is 
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 
 
 109. KleinBank apparently argues (in sections scattered throughout the motion to dismiss) 
that census data evidence as to residence by a minority individual is not proof that the 
individual owns the residence. The presumptive inference is that if the minority individual 
does not own the residence, any alleged lack of availability of residential mortgage credit to 
that individual (which credit unavailability would be a violation of both ECOA and the 
FHAct) is not relevant to the DOJ’s claim. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 7, 18–19, 27 (, US v. Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. 
June 5, 2017). 
 110. KleinBank avers that the government’s focus on the prohibited-basis composition of 
a census tract “provides no data to suggest that minorities within those tracts were treated 
differently than others in those same tracts.” Id. at 7. The bank further reasons that because 
the DOJ evidence focuses on geography rather than on individuals, the DOJ essentially 
“alleges discrimination as to the entire majority-minority census tract, which is not a protected 
class.” Id. at 27. 
 111. Id. at 19. 
 112. Id. at 27. 
 113. Memorandum in Opposition to KleinBank’s Motion to Dismiss at 8, US v. 
Kleinbank, No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. June 5, 2017) (citing, among other cases, 
Ring v. First Interstate Mortg., Inc. 984 F.2d 924, 927 (8th Cir. 1993)) (“denying a motion to 
dismiss where the complaint alleged a refusal to make available a residential real-estate 
transaction ‘based on the racial composition of the tenants of the properties or the 
neighborhoods in question’”). 
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is plausible on its face.’”114  Here, there is disagreement between the 
parties as to whether the statistically significant differences between the 
lending patterns of KleinBank and its peers constitute sufficient facts.  As 
earlier stated, all prior cases have been settled and not litigated, so the 
final determination as to the applicability of the legal arguments on both 
sides depends on the progression of this case all the way through the 
judicial process. 
2. BancorpSouth 
The 2015 joint complaint by the DOJ and the CFPB against 
BancorpSouth is notable for the breadth and depth of the fair lending 
allegations.115  The factual allegations, although neither proven nor 
admitted as true, may provide a classic case study in “what not to do.”  
The complaint also includes two particularly striking aspects: there 
apparently exists an audio recording of statements made during an 
internal meeting that would tend to support a rare charge of overt 
discrimination,116 and the CFPB relied on its first-ever use of mystery 
shoppers to evidence a claim of individualized disparate treatment.117 
In the complaint, the government parties allege that 
BancorpSouth committed various fair lending violations, including 
redlining and disparate treatment in its marketing efforts.118  In sum, the 
government parties proclaimed that “[t]he totality of BancorpSouth’s 
acts, policies, and practices . . . ha[d] the effect of denying or 
discouraging [] an equal credit opportunity to the prospective applicants 
of the majority-minority neighborhoods” on a prohibited basis,119 without 
 
 114. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 13, US v. Kleinbank, 
No. 17-cv-136 (RHK/FLN) (D. Minn. June 5, 2017) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). KleinBank 
argues that reliance by the DOJ on statistical evidence is tantamount to a conclusory assertion, 
and therefore the DOJ has not sufficiently stated a particularized claim. Id. at 16. 
 115. Complaint, United States v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 1:16cv118-GHD-DAS  ¶ 3 (N. 
D. Miss. June 29, 2016) (declaring that “BancorpSouth discriminated in a number of distinct 
ways through virtually every stage of the lending process.”). 
 116. Id. ¶¶ 90 – 98. See supra note 36 noting the rarity of reported cases of overt 
discrimination in the residential mortgage lending context. 
 117. Id. ¶¶ 99 – 112. 
 118. Id. ¶ 4, ¶¶ 18 – 51, including a discussion of alleged marketing violations at ¶¶ 42 – 
45; ECOA Count 1 (Redlining) at ¶¶ 113 – 117; FHAct Count 1 (Redlining) at ¶¶ 136 – 140. 
 119. Id. ¶ 51. The reference to the “[t]otality of [the bank’s] acts, policies and practices is 
unusual and speaks to the many and varied ways in which BancorpSouth was alleged to have 
violated fair lending laws. 
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justification “by business necessity or legitimate business 
considerations.”120 
The disparate treatment redlining allegations include opening 
branches only in majority-white neighborhoods,121 failing to market loan 
products in minority neighborhoods,122 and actively discouraging 
applications from prospective borrowers residing in minority 
neighborhoods.123  This case used statistical analysis of HMDA loan 
application and origination data in the affected areas in comparison to its 
peers.124  
Additionally, using the more traditional CRA-based redlining 
standard,125 the government parties took issue with the bank’s reliance on 
business emanating from its CRA assessment areas.126  The government 
parties proffered the bank’s exclusion of high-minority census tracts from 
its CRA assessment areas as evidence of unlawful discrimination.127  The 
government parties further alleged that the bank discouraged mortgage 
lending outside of its CRA assessment areas by characterizing such loans 
as “undesirable.”128  Another element of the complaint was that all of the 
bank’s branches were located in non-minority areas.129 
The disparate marketing treatment claims state that 
BancorpSouth focused its advertising in majority-White neighborhoods, 
but failed to advertise meaningfully in high-minority neighborhoods.130  
Additionally, the government parties charge that the bank focused its 
 
 120. Complaint, United States v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 1:16cv118-GHD-DAS  ¶ 137. 
See also infra note 153. 
 121. Id. ¶ 34. 
 122. Id. ¶¶ 42–45. 
 123. Id. ¶¶ 23, 46. 
 124. Id. ¶¶ 47–50. 
 125. See, e.g., supra notes 30 and 70. The more traditional standard is distinguished from 
disparate treatment redlining, which has become a major examination focus. But see 
Complaint at 6, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 1:16cv-00118-GHD-
DAS, n. 4 (N. D. Miss. filed June 29, 2016) (acknowledging that “Plaintiffs do not have 
authority to enforce the CRA and do not purport to do so here. Rather, Plaintiffs cite to the 
Bank’s exclusion of majority-minority neighborhoods from its designated assessment area as 
evidence that the Bank engaged in unlawful discrimination in violation of ECOA and the 
FHA”). 
 126. Complaint at ¶¶ 23–34, CFPB v. BancorpSouth, No. 1:16cv118-GHD-DAS; see 
supra note 52 (regarding the occasional conflation between fair lending and CRA compliance. 
 127. Complaint at ¶¶ 23–41, CFPB v. BancorpSouth, No. 1:16cv118-GHD-DAS. 
 128. Id. ¶ 31. 
 129. Id. ¶ 35. Note that the bank has no loan production offices. All residential mortgage 
loan officers are located in retail bank branches. 
 130. Id. ¶ 42. 
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marketing efforts on promoting individual loan originators, the vast 
majority of whom were White, rather than on advertising the availability 
of its loan products.131  Further, the government parties took exception 
with the fact that there was no specific targeting of marketing efforts 
towards minority communities.132 
Remarkably, the bank had been warned previously by the CFPB 
of possible redlining violations, but it took no substantive corrective 
actions.133  The consent order specifically mentioned this perceived 
disregard for the importance of a higher degree of compliance, which 
disregard may well have had an impact on the level of penalties ultimately 
assessed.134  
3. Eagle Bank 
The settlement between the DOJ and Eagle Bank and Trust Co. 
of Missouri, with just $900 million in assets, demonstrates that even 
smaller community banks are not immune from interest by the DOJ.135  
The matter was referred by the bank’s prudential regulator based on an 
examination finding of a pattern or practice of fair lending violations,136 
which primarily relied on a statistical analysis of the bank’s HMDA 
application and origination data in affected areas compared to its peers.137  
But despite the regulatory finding of a pattern or practice, the bank got 
off relatively easily in its settlement with the DOJ: although the bank was 
ordered to create a (relatively small) $800,000 loan subsidy fund, open 
two new full-service branches in minority areas, and employ a full-time 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. ¶ 45. 
 133. Id. ¶¶ 39-41 (noting that outside consultants had provided the bank with advice 
regarding viable expansion opportunities in high-minority census tracts that would be helpful 
for fair lending compliance). See also infra Part III.B (discussing the best practices that an 
institution can adopt to reduce the risk of an allegation of fair lending violations). 
 134. It may be that such disregard is viewed by government parties as an aggravating 
factor during settlement negotiations, resulting in the assessment of heightened penalties and 
a greater degree of monitoring for future compliance. 
 135. Complaint at ¶ 3, United States of American v. Eagle Bank and Trust Company of 
Missouri, No. 4:15-cv-01492 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 136. Id. ¶¶ 7 – 8. 
 137. Id. ¶¶ 19 – 21. 
 
2018] REDLINING POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS 95 
Director of Community Development, importantly, no civil monetary 
penalties were imposed.138 
One likely explanation for the relatively minor consequences is 
found in the consent order itself.  An entire paragraph is devoted to a 
discussion of the proactive initiatives undertaken by Eagle Bank during 
the course of the DOJ investigation.139  Specifically, the DOJ 
acknowledged the bank’s voluntary commencement of outreach 
programs in majority-minority census tracts and the voluntary expansion 
of its branch presence in majority-minority neighborhoods.  The DOJ 
stated that “this consent order is intended to facilitate the continuation of 
[these] outreach efforts.”140  
4. Hudson City Savings Bank 
The case against Hudson City Savings Bank resulted in the 
largest-dollar joint DOJ/CFPB settlement to-date, which included a $5.5 
million civil monetary penalty and a requirement to spend at least $25 
million on a loan subsidy program.141  Here, the government parties took 
issue with the way in which the bank “structur[ed] its business . . . to 
avoid” meeting the residential mortgage credit needs of majority-Black-
and-Hispanic neighborhoods.142  The specific redlining allegations 
involved the bank’s decisions related to branch and loan officer 
placement that discouraged minority applications,143 its decisions related 
 
 138. See Consent Order, United States v. Eagle Bank and Trust Company of Missouri, No. 
4:15-cv-01492 ¶¶ 12, 21, 30 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2015). In a settled complaint, the complaint 
and consent order are filed simultaneously in the appropriate federal jurisdiction. It is a 
common negotiated element of redlining consent orders that the financial institution hire a 
full-time Director of Community Development (or similarly titled management-level 
employee). 
 139. Id.  ¶¶ 3 – 4 (noting that “[t]he United States recognizes that during the investigation, 
Eagle has voluntarily undertaken several initiatives to help further meet the credit needs of 
residents located in majority-African-American census tracts in the Missouri portion of the 
St. Louis MSA,” and highlighting examples of helpful steps the bank had already undertaken). 
 140. Id. at 3. Given the favorable impact these proactive measures appeared to have in 
lessening the remediation burden on Eagle Bank, institutions in similar situations should 
follow suit and initiate remedial actions as soon as potential issues are identified. See 
discussion accompanying infra note 178. 
 141. Consent Order, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, and United States of America v. Hudson 
City Sav. Bank, No. 2:15-cv-07056, ¶ 25 (D. N.J. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 142. Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, and United States of America v. Hudson 
City Sav. Bank, No. 2:15-cv-07056, ¶ 1 (D. N.J. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 143. Id. ¶ 33. Another item of note is that the bank relied heavily on a network of mortgage 
brokers, with approximately 80 percent of its mortgage applications being generated by 
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to CRA assessment area designations which the government parties 
asserted were drawn with the intent to obviously exclude counties having  
the highest proportion of majority-minority neighborhoods,144 and the 
bank’s failure to market to potential applicants in majority-minority 
neighborhoods.145  The allegations were based largely on a statistical 
analysis of HMDA application data as compared to its peers in the 
affected areas, but, in contrast to other similar redlining investigations, 
the complaint did not include allegations based on disparities in 
origination data.146 
One important factor that may have influenced the size of the 
penalty and the total settlement obligations is that the CFPB had 
previously asked the bank to do its own internal redlining analysis and 
make any necessary adjustments, but the bank “failed to do so.”147  
5. Associated Bank 
HUD also has been active in disparate treatment redlining matters 
the past few years.148  The largest HUD settlement ever was reached in 
2015 with Associated Bank, based on a complaint initiated by the HUD 
 
brokers, as compared with 20 percent of the applications being generated by loan originators 
affiliated with its retail branch facilities. Id. at ¶ 14. Furthermore, none of the retail branches 
located in majority-minority census tracts would accept mortgage loan applications, but 
instead referred the potential applicants to retail loan officers situated in its branches that were 
located in low-minority census tracts. Id. ¶¶  20-21. 
 144. Federal prudential regulators have the sole authority to enforce CRA compliance. 
See, e.g., supra note 32. Despite the lack of authority by the plaintiff parties here to allege 
CRA violations, see also, supra note 125, the DOJ and the CFPB concluded that, purely on 
the basis of the bank’s exclusion of certain majority-minority census tracts from the CRA 
assessment areas, any potential applicants from those areas were the victims of illegal 
discrimination. The government parties reasoned that such census-tract-based exclusion kept 
potential applicants residing in the excluded census tracts from securing benefits (such as 
discounted home improvement loans) that were generally offered to low-to-moderate income 
applicants residing within a designated CRA assessment area. See Complaint, Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau, and United States v. Hudson City Sav. Bank, No. 2:15-cv-07056, ¶ 41 (D. N.J. 
Sept. 24, 2015). 
 145. Note that in this complaint, there is no distinction drawn between traditional 
redlining, disparate treatment redlining, and disparate marketing treatment, as is sometimes 
the case. 
 146. See, e.g., Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, and United States of America v. 
Hudson City Sav. Bank, No. 2:15-cv-07056, ¶¶ 59–63 (D. N.J. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 147. Id. ¶ 66.  See also infra Part III.B (discussing the best practices that an institution can 
adopt to reduce the risk of an allegation of fair lending violations). 
 148. See, e.g., 2017 BANKING INSTITUTE PRESENTATION, supra note 87. 
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secretary.149  The primary allegation was that the bank was 
“underserving” African-American and Hispanic geographic areas, 
“despite demand for residential mortgage loans” emanating from those 
areas.150  HUD determined that the bank’s lending comprised “a smaller 
share of the market in higher-minority population census tracts than” in 
its market share in other non-minority areas, based largely on a statistical 
analysis of the bank’s HMDA data.151  
The most noteworthy aspect of this consent order may be HUD’s 
requirement that the bank more than double the planned expansion of its 
physical presence.152  As with other matters in which the cases were 
settled, information is not publicly available regarding the impact 
competition from other area banks played in Associated Bank’s ability to 
win mortgage business. 
III. WHAT HAS CHANGED? 
As discussed in Part II, there has been a metamorphosis in the 
way disparate treatment redlining is alleged and evidenced. Rather than 
focusing primarily on the traditional, CRA-assessment-area-based 
analysis, the recent trend has been to utilize a peer-based analysis of 
HMDA application- and origination-volume data. Under the former 
approach, regulatory or enforcement agencies needed to evidence a 
conscious intent to exclude certain geographic areas based on the legally 
protected characteristics of the area’s population.  Now, statistical 
analysis is used to show that a bank with application or origination 
volumes, measured as a percentage, significantly below the peer-group 
 
 149. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., CONCILIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND ASSOCIATED BANK, 
N.A., [hereinafter CONCILIATION AGREEMENT], https://archives.hud.gov/news/2015/pr15-
064b-ExecAssBankConAgrmnt.pdf. The accompanying press release succinctly summarizes 
the terms of the nearly $200 million agreement. Press Release by Brian Sullivan, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV, HUD & ASSOCIATED BANK REACH HISTORIC $200 MILLION 
SETTLEMENT OF ‘REDLINING’ CLAIM (MAY 26, 2015) https://archives.hud.gov/news/2015/pr 
15-064b.cfm. The press release includes HUD Secretary Julian Castro’s assertion that the 
“settlement sends a strong message that HUD does not tolerate practices that unfairly restrict 
an equal and open housing market.” Id. 
 150. CONCILIATION AGREEMENT, supra note 149, at 2. 
 151. CONCILIATION AGREEMENT, supra note 149, at 2. 
 152. CONCILIATION AGREEMENT, supra note 149, at 18 (requiring the bank to open four 
loan production offices in majority-minority areas within thirty months of the settlement date, 
in addition to the three full-service retail bank branches it was already in the process of 
opening). 
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average, is at risk of a redlining allegation. In essence, the new approach 
focuses on results in order to back into intent.153  The increasing 
predominance of nondepository mortgage lenders, who have no CRA 
obligations and therefore have no CRA assessment areas by which to 
measure geographic focus, may be driving the development of this new 
standard.154 
Another new distinction appears to be emerging from that of the 
traditional redlining analysis conducted in the CRA context.  In a CRA 
compliance examination by federal prudential bank regulators, the bank 
is granted credit for low-to-moderate-income mortgage loans purchased 
from other institutions at any time subsequent to loan origination.155  In 
recent cases, however, the CFPB and the DOJ have elected to exclude 
these purchases from its analysis of compliance with fair lending laws.156  
It may be argued that this shift is merely reflective of the tension in 
statutory purposes between the CRA and fair lending, such that the focus 
is now on application and origination, rather than on whether a bank buys 
and sells loans originated by others.157 
 
 153. One unfortunate outcome for institutions is that the intense pressure to settle, rather 
than litigate, deprives the institution from having an opportunity to present its business 
justifications as a defense to a disparate treatment redlining allegation. 
 154. See generally Tammy Butler & David Skanderson, Redlining Risk—Walking a Fine 
Line, in MORTGAGE BANKING (July 2016). 
 155. See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Large Institution CRA 
Examination Procedures 4-6, available at https://www.ffiec.gov/cra/pdf/cra_exlarge.pdf. 
 156. See, e.g., 2017 BANKING INSTITUTE PRESENTATION, supra note 87. As an example, 
purchased loans were excluded from the government parties’ fair lending analysis in the 
Hudson City case. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 157. The difference in statutory purpose between the CRA (“to help meet the credit needs 
of the communities they serve, including communities of low-to-moderate income [LMI] 
levels,” see supra note 35) and the fair lending statutes of ECOA and the FHAct (prohibition 
from discrimination that is based on a protected characteristic, see discussion supra Part I.B) 
may be foundational to any supervisory or enforcement decision to exclude purchased loans 
from a pure fair lending analysis. A bank’s purchase of already originated residential 
mortgage loans does not expand the availability of credit to those in protected classes. In other 
words, the purchase of such loans is part of the CRA statutory scheme and, while relevant to 
an institution’s compliance with CRA, does not promote actual fair lending compliance. In 
point of fact, the LMI focus of the CRA in contrast to the prohibited-basis focus of fair lending 
law can be confusing for depository lenders. By way of example, supra note 144 illustrates 
an instance in which the two statutory purposes, as applied, seemed to be in direct conflict. In 
that example, Hudson City Savings Bank’s CRA program included a product generally 
available to all LMI applicants living in one of the bank’s CRA assessment areas. But because 
the bank excluded from access to the product anyone living in a majority-minority census 
tract that was not part of the CRA assessment area, a fair lending violation was alleged. It is 
also important to the fair lending analysis to note that implementation of the 2015 HMDA 
Final Rule as written will enable tracking of residential mortgage loan purchases and sales as 
a possible deterrent against banks using residential mortgage loan purchase activity merely to 
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There is also a new focus on “high-Black-and-Hispanic” 
measurement areas (that is, measurement areas158 comprised of more than 
80 percent combined Black or Hispanic individuals),159 as distinguished 
from “high-minority” measurement areas with a singular minority 
population greater than 80 percent or “majority-minority” measurement 
areas with a singular or combined minority population of more than 50 
percent.  This combination of the race and ethnicity composition of a 
measurement area can be a challenge for the tracking software that is 
utilized by financial institutions to proactively monitor for fair lending 
compliance.160  There also seems to be minimal concern by supervisory 
and enforcement agencies for application of fair lending principles to 
certain races, such as individuals of East Asian descent, even though by 
definition those of Asian descent are included in the list of protected 
classes.161  No rationale has been articulated for the occasional absence 
of such East Asian, for example, racial information in document 
production requests related to judicial investigations or the regulatory 
agency analysis that can result in supervisory administrative action or 
referral. 
A. Opportunities For States To Fill Gaps In Federal Redlining 
Enforcement 
Since the 2016 presidential election, there has been much 
speculation as to whether the new administration’s influence over the 
leadership of the DOJ, HUD, federal prudential regulators, and the 
CFPB162 may result in any change in emphasis as to the supervision and 
 
boost CRA ratings, effective with HMDA data beginning January 1, 2018. But see, supra note 
28 (discussing the current state of flux as to possible supervision and enforcement of the rule 
as promulgated). 
 158. This measurement is usually, but not always, based on the census tracts established 
by the U.S. Bureau of Census for analyzing populations. 
 159. See, e.g., Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau & United States v. Hudson City 
Sav. Bank, No. 2:15-cv-07056, at ¶ 57 (D. N.J. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 160. Because race is captured in different HMDA data fields than ethnicity, fair lending 
compliance software generally has not been designed to analyze the race and ethnicity fields 
in combination, making internal institutional compliance monitoring more difficult. 
 161. See, e.g., 2017 BANKING INSTITUTE PRESENTATION, supra note 87. 
 162. The original CFPB Director, Richard Cordray, whose term was not set to expire until 
July 2018, resigned from his position effective at midnight November 24, 2017. Just prior to 
his resignation, Mr. Cordray appointed his Chief of Staff, Leandra English, as Deputy 
Director, in an apparent attempt to have Ms. English succeed him in an Acting Director 
capacity as arguably prescribed by the Dodd-Frank Act (as codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)). 
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enforcement of consumer-oriented financial regulations and fair lending 
law.  If federal regulators fail to act, however, the states, if so inclined, 
have the authority to pick up the slack.   
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act163 provides that any state’s 
attorney general (“AG”) may bring a civil action to enforce provisions of 
or regulations issued under Title X, either in Federal district court or in a 
state court located in the AG’s home state, and secure remedies under the 
same.164  Notably, even though an important exception provides that a 
state AG may only enforce upon a national bank or federal savings 
association “a regulation prescribed by the Bureau under a provision of 
this title,”165 a broad interpretation of this provision means that a state AG 
has authority to enforce violations of ECOA against all financial 
institutions, including national banks and federal savings associations.166  
Similarly, a state regulator may bring a civil action or any “other 
appropriate proceeding” to enforce Dodd-Frank’s Title X provisions or 
any regulations issued thereunder as to institutions that are state-chartered 
or “[i]ncorporated, licensed or otherwise authorized to do business under 
State law,” and to secure remedies under the same.167 
 
However, President Donald Trump immediately appointed as Acting Director Mr. Mick 
Mulvaney, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, under the apparent authority 
of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (codified at 5 U.S.C .§ 3345 et seq.). Mr. 
Mulvaney’s position as Acting CFPB Director has already survived a motion by Ms. English 
for a temporary restraining order and a second motion by Ms. English for a preliminary 
injunction. Although those motions were unsuccessful, it is doubtful that the legal battles over 
the position have ended. Additionally, President Trump likely will at some point nominate 
someone for Senate confirmation of the Directorship. Until the position is officially filled by 
a permanent Director, the direction and tenor of the agency may be in flux. Already, Acting 
Director Mulvaney—a very vocal opponent of the Dodd-Frank Act and the CFPB during his 
tenure in the U.S. House of Representatives—has shown signs of attempting to roll back many 
initiatives, regulations and enforcement matters that were in process at the time of Mr. 
Cordray’s resignation.  See, e.g., infra note 168. 
 163. Title X is also known as the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. 
 164. 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2016). 
 165. § 5552(a)(2)(B) (2016). State AGs do not have the authority to enforce “provisions” 
of Title X in matters involving a national bank or a federal savings association. Although 
unrelated to the subject of this Article, the primary importance of this distinction is that, unless 
and until the CFPB promulgates regulations regarding the UDAAP (unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices) provision introduced by Title X, a state AG may not enforce federal 
UDAAP violations against a national bank or federal savings association, and must instead 
rely on state UDAP law. 
 166. 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2016). The Equal Credit Opportunity Act is one of the “enumerated 
consumer laws” listed in 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12) for which the CFPB has authority, and which 
can also be enforced by the states. 
 167. 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2016). 
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Indeed, there has been an uptick in consumer financial regulatory 
supervision and enforcement by certain states, even preceding the 
election.  In September 2015, Evans Bank settled a redlining claim 
brought by the New York AG, Eric Schneiderman.168  More recently, the 
Maryland state legislature formed a Consumer Protection Commission in 
April 2017 to fill “gaps created by the Trump administration’s 
deregulatory efforts.”169  In July of 2017, the Pennsylvania AG created a 
new Consumer Financial Protection Unit that is headed by one of the 
original United States Treasury team members that stood up the CFPB.170  
Other states also have a long history of strong consumer financial and 
civil rights protection at both the state AG and the state financial 
regulatory levels.171 
 
 168. See Press Release by Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney General, N.Y. State Office 
of the Attorney General (Sep. 10, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
secures-agreement-evans-bank-ending-discriminatory-mortgage-redlining. Much more 
recently, “the superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services” stated on 
Jan. 25, 2018, that the “agency would work to fill any consumer protection gaps that federal 
regulators create,” citing “disappoint[ment with] recent moves at the CFPB under the 
leadership of Mick Mulvaney that have signaled that the federal consumer finance watchdog 
would take a different tack in its enforcement and oversight . . . .” Evan Weinberger, NY Vows 
to Fill Consumer Protection Gaps Mulvaney Creates, LAW 360 (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1005843/ny-vows-to-fill-consumer-protection-gaps-mulvaney-
creates. 
 169. Lalita Clozel, States preparing to pick up slack if CFPB backs down, AMERICAN 
BANKER (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/states-preparing-to-pick-
up-slack-if-cfpb-backs-down. 
 170. Press release by Josh Shapiro, Attorney General Penn., Office of Attorney General, 
(July 20, 2017), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/Media_and_Resources/Press_Releas 
es/Press_Release/?pid=3757. Interestingly, the Pennsylvania AG recently filed suit in state 
court against a student loan servicer that closely emulates an earlier federal case brought by 
the CFPB, possibly out of “concern that the CFPB under Mulvaney would not litigate the case 
as aggressively as under previous leadership.” Stephen Piepgrass & Robert Claiborne, Jr., 
Appointment of CFPB Director Causes Rift Among State AGs, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2018), https:/
/www.law360.com/articles/1005757/appointment-of-cfpb-director-causes 
 171. In addition to the aforementioned states, the AGs for The District of Columbia, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington were among a total of 
eighteen state AGs and the District of Columbia AG that filed an amicus curiae brief on Dec. 
8, 2017, in support of the motion for preliminary injunction filed by Leandra English, Deputy 
CFPB Director. Complaint, English v. Trump & Mulvaney, No. (filed Dec. 8, 2017), http://
guptawessler.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/StatesBrief.pdf. This same group of eighteen 
AGs “authored a letter to President Trump backing past CFPB actions, expressing concerns 
regarding the direction that the CFPB may be taking under Mr. Mulvaney, and asserting that, 
to the extent the CFPB does not continue to vigorously protect consumers from financial fraud 
and harm, the state attorneys general will do so.” MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP, CFPB 
AND STATE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION YEAR IN REVIEW, JDSUPRA (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfpb-and-state-consumer-financial-99027/.  Although 
the North Carolina state AG did not join the brief or letter, North Carolina also has a strong 
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B. Best Practices for Financial Institutions 
A careful reading of the various redlining complaints and their 
accompanying consent orders provide a great deal of instruction as to the 
types of behavior to avoid to reduce the risk of landing in a similar 
predicament.  A few common themes are prevalent.172 
  
• It is incredibly important that an institution have comprehensive fair 
lending policies and procedures that appropriately address current 
supervision and enforcement trends.  In addition, there should be an 
overarching fair lending statement from the board and senior 
management that demonstrates the institution’s commitment to fair 
lending principles. 
 
• A robust Compliance Management System (“CMS”), incorporating 
the above policies and procedures, is essential.173  Regulatory 
agencies will scrutinize the sufficiency of the CMS during their 
periodic supervisory examinations, and will view the absence of a 
CMS as a significant risk factor for potential fair lending and other 
regulatory compliance violations. 
 
• Elements of an effective CMS include, but are not limited to: 
  
o annual fair lending training that is appropriately tailored 
to the duties and responsibilities of the trainee, which 
should include training for members of the board of 
directors and senior management;174 
  
 
record of consumer financial protection, as demonstrated by participation of the North 
Carolina Deputy AG as a lead negotiator in the $25 billion 2012 National Mortgage 
Settlement. See, e.g., Philip A. Lehman, Executive Summary of Multistate/Federal Settlement 
of Foreclosure Misconduct Claims, https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/
NMS_Executive_Summary-7-23-2012.pdf. 
 172. It is likely advisable that an institution seek the assistance of experienced counsel, 
and consultants as necessary (hired by counsel), to proactively or reactively address fair 
lending issues and concerns. 
 173. Note that Hudson City did not have an adequate CMS, but instead had only a single 
statement asserting that it was “an equal opportunity lender.” See Complaint , Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau, and United States of America v. Hudson City Sav. Bank, No. 2:15-cv-07056 at 
¶ 65 (D. N.J. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 174. Although presently an expectation by regulatory agencies, this training element for 
members of the board may be cast aside for institutions under $10 billion in assets who are 
regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) under the new proposed board oversight 
regime currently undergoing notice and comment by the FRB. 
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o identification of and monitoring for elements of the 
underwriting and pricing process that may involve 
employee discretion; 
  
o built-in mechanisms that monitor for and require 
appropriate approval for exceptions or departures from 
documented requirements; 
 
o back-end monitoring for disparities that may have 
occurred on a prohibited basis, including periodic 
redlining analysis to identify practically or statistically 
significant disparities; 
  
o capture and monitoring of consumer complaints, and 
timely reporting and prompt corrective action to address 
the underlying issues; and 
  
o timely and adequate remediation of identified harm, and, 
if systemic, identification of corrective action to alleviate 
future occurrence. 
 
• To better understand the redlining risk, the institution should 
evaluate: 
  
o its product mix (particularly in comparison to competing 
institutions);  
 
o the location of branches and loan production offices, and 
any plans for expansion or contraction;  
 
o CRA assessment area(s) (for banks); 
  
o opportunities for community investments and 
partnerships; and  
 
o advertising and marketing efforts. 
 
• Because of the recent emphasis on statistics-based peer-group 
analysis, the institution should identify (and periodically reevaluate, 
as necessary) appropriate peer group members, and understand their 
business models, product offerings, loan production channels, and 
trends.175 
 
 175. During the course of a regulatory examination or an enforcement action, it is 
appropriate to challenge the composition of the peer group against which the institution’s 
performance is being measured. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 74 (suggesting ways by 
which an institution should “Carefully Define [its] Competition . . . .”). Factors to look for in 
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• To the extent the institution’s business model utilizes a network of 
third-party originators (“TPOs”), careful thought should be given to 
the appropriate level of oversight and monitoring of TPO practices 
and activity.176  Because such TPOs often engage with potential 
applicants who reside or wish to purchase property in geographic 
areas that are widely dispersed from the institution’s retail locations, 
the institution’s redlining analysis should consider adding these TPO 
coverage areas to its “reasonably expected market area.”177 
 
• Given the favorable impact proactive measures had in lessening the 
remediation burden imposed in a previously settled case, the 
institution should initiate remedial action as soon as potential issues 
are identified by the institution prior to or during the pendency of 
any investigation.178 
  
• Finally, and most importantly, the institution should heed carefully 
any formal warnings from its regulator and take prompt, corrective 
action to mitigate the future risk.  Failure to do so may result in 
heightened penalties and greater future scrutiny.179  
 
differentiating between institutional business models include: the institution’s mix of loan 
purpose options (such as a purchase, refinance, home equity line of credit or home equity 
conversion mortgage); loan product offerings (such as fixed- or adjustable-rate products); loan 
types (conventional or government-backed); loan production channels (third-party or retail 
originators, and brick-and-mortar or on-line presence); and geographic coverage areas. 
 176. Note that these TPOs are deemed to be subject to the institution’s vendor risk 
management system protocols, just like any other vendor. Ultimately, in most cases, the 
institution is responsible for the fair lending violations of its TPOs. By way of example, the 
Hudson City complaint alleged that the actions of the bank’s TPOs led to fair lending 
violations. Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, and United States v. Hudson City Sav. 
Bank, No. 2:15-cv-07056, ¶¶ 24-32 (D. N.J. Sept. 24, 2015). That said, TPOs are not the only 
loan originators subject to scrutiny: the Union and Guardian combined complaint alleged fair 
lending issues related to the hiring and training of its retail loan originators. Complaint, United 
States v. Union Savings Bank, No. 1:16CV1172, ¶ 44 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2016).  Note also 
that new HMDA reporting will enable analysis of broker activities. See supra note 28. 
 177. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 32; see supra notes 104 
and 107. 
 178. See supra note 140. 
 179. As has been earlier noted, BancorpSouth was warned by the CFPB of possible 
violations, and its failure to act may have led to heightened penalties. See supra note 133. 
Hudson City failed to perform an internal redlining analysis after having been told to do so 
by the CFPB. See supra note 147. Union Bank’s internal compliance group regularly reported 
to the board of directors that improvement was required, to no avail. Complaint, United States 
v. Union Savings Bank, No. 1:16CV1172, ¶ 40 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2016). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Longstanding fair lending laws returned to sharp focus during the 
Obama administration.  As part of the laws’ reemergence, a new 
evidentiary standard of discriminatory disparate treatment redlining was 
developed.  This new version of redlining focuses on a comparative 
statistical analysis of market penetration in certain geographies, without 
regard for the underlying business justifications that may drive the 
outcomes.  
Importantly, the underlying standards of proof have yet to be fully 
tested in a court of law.  KleinBank has recently elected to litigate, rather 
than settle.  However, the facts in that case may be squarely in favor of 
the bank as outlined in its motion to dismiss, such that a fully articulated 
decision on the merits of redlining may never be reached.  Thus, it may 
be some time until there is a more complete picture of the future of the 
new standard and the associated means of proof applicable to disparate 
treatment redlining.  
In addition, the question as to the appropriateness of a newly 
presumed affirmative obligation to market and advertise residential 
mortgage loan products to individuals and geographic areas based on 
prohibited basis characteristics has not yet been answered, although it is 
an element of the pending litigation. 
While it remains to be seen whether a focus on fair lending 
supervision and enforcement in general, and disparate treatment redlining 
and disparate marketing treatment in particular, will continue under the 
leadership of a new presidential administration, many lessons can be 
learned, and should be heeded, from the activity of the recent past. 
 
